Effective Demonstrative Evidence
We always look for ways to get the most value for our litigation expense investment. Not long ago, I secured a defense verdict in a case where the plaintiff turned left in front of a truck driven by my client. The issue was whether or not he had time to react and avoid the collision. Using a radar gun and exemplar vehicle, the plaintiff’s expert recreated what he believed was the acceleration of the plaintiff’s vehicle through the interchange. One of our most effective demonstrative exhibits was a split screen clip comparing the product of the expert’s calculations (on the right) with the actual flow of traffic at the time of day when the accident occurred. Click here if video embed does not appear below.
For further information, contact Steve Schwinn at 703-246-0900.
Posted by D. Stephenson Schwinn on 01/20/2014 at 06:47 PM
Expert Witness Issues
Motor Vehicle Accidents
John O. Easton Has Become Senior Counsel to the Firm, Effective December 1, 2013
Jordan Coyne & Savits, L.L.P. is pleased to announce that John O. Easton, who has practiced law for 32 years as a partner of the Firm, has become Senior Counsel to the Firm effective December 1, 2013. Mr. Easton will continue to handle legal matters in his new capacity.
Mr. Easton received his J.D. in 1977 from George Mason University and his undergraduate degree from Baylor University in 1966. He served seven years as an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps (1966-1973), including a tour in Viet Nam as an infantry platoon commander and infantry company commander (1967-1968), and after leaving active duty continued to serve as an officer in the United States Marine Corps Reserve. He joined the firm as a law clerk in 1974, became an associate in 1977 and a partner in 1981.
In 1990, as a Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Commanding Officer of the 4th Civil Affairs Group, Mr. Easton was called up for active duty for the First Gulf War. He and his unit were involved actively in the 100-hour ground war at the end of February, 1991, and handled thousands of Iraqi prisoners. He ultimately was on active duty for seven months, serving in Kuwait and Iraq, and then returned to resume his legal practice with the Firm.
Mr. Easton has more than 36 years of experience in the areas of legal malpractice defense, architects and engineers malpractice defense, medical malpractice defense, products liability defense, personal injury defense and the defense of sexual assault and abuse cases. He was once again selected by his peers for inclusion in the 2013 edition of The Best Lawyers in America in the practice areas of Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants; and Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants, and was also selected for inclusion in Top Attorneys in Virginia.
Posted by David B. Stratton on 12/05/2013 at 08:54 PM
Jordan Coyne LLP news
Maryland bad faith/legal malpractice action against individual defense attorneys dismissed
In Cook v. Nationwide Insurance Company, Case No. PWG-13-882 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2013), the Court considered a "dizzying array" of motions in an insurance bad faith case arising out of an excess judgment in a motor vehicle accident case tried in Maryland state court. The federal district court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand, dismissed the case as against the non-diverse insurance defense attorneys who tried the underlying case, and set a schedule for limited discovery relating to the issue of whether there had been a settlement demand arguably within policy limits prior to the trial verdict.
In the underlying auto accident case, the insured had been driving while intoxicated and on a suspended license when he struck and injured the plaintiff's car, causing severe injuries to the plaintiff. The insured's policy only had limits of $50,000. The plaintiff brought suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, which ultimately resulted in a judgment of $892,050.52. On the first day of trial, the Plaintiff had offered to settle for $71,000, an amount consisting of the policy limits of $50,000 and $21,000 in "trial costs." The insurer had countered with an offer of $50,000 plus $4,000 in trial costs. After the judgment was returned, the insured driver executed an assignment to Plaintiff of any and all rights he had against the insurer and the defense counsel in any claims he had as a result of the handling of the claim and the trial.
The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the insurer, against the individual defense attorneys, and against their law office in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, asserting one count of bad faith/negligence. The defendants then removed the case to federal court, asserting that the individual defense attorneys who were residents of Maryland were fraudulently joined. Immediately after removal, the defendants moved to dismiss. Plaintiff then filed a motion to remand, and moved for leave to file an amended complaint.
Judge Grimm denied the plaintiff's motion to remand, on the grounds that he had failed to state any colorable claims against any non-diverse defendants, specifically, the defense attorneys. The Court noted that nowhere did the complaint even allege that the attorney defendants had control over any decisions as to whether to settle the Plaintiff's claims, or that the defendant attorneys were even aware of the $71,000 settlement demand until after the insurer had rejected it. The Court also rejected plaintiff's argument that he had stated a viable claim for legal malpractice, ruling that under Maryland law, claims for legal malpractice are not assignable, citing Claggett v. Dacy, 420 A.2d 1285, 1288 (Md. App. 1980). Accordingly, the Court held that the assignment of the insured's claims for legal malpractice was invalid as a matter of law and cannot support a claim against the defendant attorneys.
The Court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend with regard to the count of bad faith only, to allow the plaintiff to allege that the insurer had the authority to pay the $21,000 in trial costs either as an expense or as a cost under the policy, and thus had an obligation to do so under the terms of the policy. Arguably, if the $21,000 represented trial costs, then together with the $50,000 in policy limits, the $71,000 settlement demand may have been within policy limits.
With regard to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court noted that the defendants argued that the plaintiff's lowest settlement demand was $71,000, and that the insurer had offered to settle for $54,000, consisting of the policy limits of $50,000 and $4000 in costs. The Court noted that neither party has pointed out any case in which an insurance company was held liable for bad faith after offering to settle at, much less above, its policy limits.
The plaintiff argued that the $71,000 offer was within policy limits because the additional $21,000 constituted "trial costs." The Court held that plaintiff therefore alleged, "by the narrowest of margins", a plausible ground for relief. Noting that under Maryland law, "costs" do not include the prevailing party's counsel fees, the Court set a schedule for expedited and limited discovery on the issue of what expenses are included in the $21,000 of alleged costs, and any good faith basis Plaintiff may have for believing that attorney's fees or or any other expenses are "costs" under the policy.
Interestingly, while on a motion to dismiss such evidence could not be considered by the Court, the defendants' motion to dismiss noted that there were numerous settlement offers made of the policy limits, the first being made about 70 days after the accident at issue. However, the insurance company defendants evidently opted to withhold policy limits information until the plaintiff provided his medical records, and that appears not to have occurred until after suit was already filed. Reading between the lines, it appears that plaintiff's counsel may have been angered at having had to incur significant trial preparation expenses before being informed that the policy limits were only $50,000.
Posted by David B. Stratton on 08/27/2013 at 07:56 PM
Partner Carol T. Stone selected for inclusion in 2014 edition of The Best Lawyers in America
Congratulations to Partner Carol T. Stone on having again been selected by her peers for inclusion in the 20th Edition of The Best Lawyers in America for in the practice areas of: Legal Malpractice Law - Defendants and Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants.
Best Lawyers is based on an exhaustive peer-review survey in which attorneys submit confidential evaluations on the legal abilities of other lawyers in their practice areas. Additional information regarding the Best Lawyers selection methodology is available here. Corporate Counsel magazine has called Best Lawyers “the most respected referral list of attorneys in practice.”
Posted by David B. Stratton on 08/18/2013 at 01:23 PM
Jordan Coyne LLP news
DC CPPA: Complaint based on bank’s undisclosed use of overseas call centers is dismissed
By David B. Stratton
In Floyd v. Bank of America Corporation, No. 12-CV-591 (D.C. July 11, 2013), the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a complaint under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (the "CPPA"), addressing the issues of standing and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The Complaint, filed by and on behalf of customers of Bank of America, alleged that the Bank's use of telephone call centers in India resulted in the transmission of digitized financial records and passwords so that overseas personnel can provide service. Thus, the Complaint alleged that such transmissions were exposed to surveillance, interception or seizure by the U.S. government. The Complaint further alleged that the Bank gave customers a ten-digit customer-service telephone number, which gave customers a reasonable expectation that the telephone call would be within the United States and subject to the privacy protections of U.S. laws, and that customers are not notified that their electronic data is being transmitted to a foreign country.
The Bank first moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiffs alleged no concrete injury and therefore lacked standing. Alternatively, the Bank moved to dismiss on the ground that the Complaint failed to state a claim under the CPPA. The Superior Court dismissed the Complaint for lack of standing.
On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals disagreed as to the dismissal due to lack of standing. Citing to the Grayson decision, the Court stated that while a lawsuit under the CPPA does not relieve a plaintiff of the requirement to show a concrete injury-in-fact to herself, she may make a showing of concrete injury in fact by alleging that she is a consumer of the defendant's services and that the defendant has misrepresented material facts about the service or has failed to inform the plaintiff of material information about the service. Thus, it was enough in Grayson that the plaintiff had asserted an invasion of his statutory legal right created by the CPPA to truthful and non-misleading information regarding the fate of the value of unused minutes on the calling cards he had purchased.
Thus, what mattered for standing under the CPPA in this case was that the plaintiffs alleged that they are Bank customers and that the Bank made misrepresentations and omissions in providing them information about its services they utilized.
The Court then proceeded to consider the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims under the CPPA. The Court agreed with the Bank that the fatal defect in plaintiffs' CPPA claims about the call centers was that the plaintiffs failed to point to any representations that the Bank made to the effect that, in providing customer service, every Bank call center representative can "invoke the protection of the laws of the United States to exclude the U.S. Government from unfettered access to customers' financial records." Therefore, the Court held that the Complaint failed to state a legally viable claim under section 28-3904(a) of the CPPA.
The Court reasoned that the CPPA's reference to representations about the "characteristics" and "standard" of the Bank's "services", refers to misrepresentations about the Bank's "economic output." Yet, the Complaint did not allege misrepresentations about the Bank's economic output, but instead alleges a misrepresentation about other matters, i.e., the legal environment and the climate of surveillance. Therefore, the allegations about the use of the ten-digit telephone number did not state a claim under the CPPA's section 28-3904(a) and (d).
The Court also found that the Complaint failed to state a claim under section 28-3904(f) of the CPPA, because there was no allegation of a misrepresentation of a "material fact." Rather, what was not disclosed was a legal assessment of the implications of the Bank's use of overseas call centers. Further, there was no allegation that a significant number of consumers would find that information important in determining a course of action. Thus, the omitted information was not "material" within the meaning of section 28-3904(f).
The Court also concluded as a matter of law that merely by providing the plaintiffs with a ten-digit domestic-looking telephone number for customer service, the Bank did not use deceptive or representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services. In a footnote, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that since calls can be made to Canada and most Caribbean nations by dialing a ten-digit number without dialing an 011 exchange, it is not true that the indispensable feature of an international call is a number with more than ten digits. Further, the Court noted that with VOIP telephone services, a telephone number is no longer tied to a specific geographic area.
In sum, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's Order dismissing the case.
As this case illustrates, because a claim under the CPPA can result in enhanced damages, plus an award of attorney's fees and costs, it is a common practice to challenge the legal sufficiency of such claims with an early dispositive motion, whenever possible -- as the Bank successfully did here. No doubt it was also important to the Bank in this case to knock these claims out early, rather than become mired in extensive electronic discovery concerning its use of overseas calling centers.
Premises Liability: Maryland landowner not in possession or control of the premises
It has long been the general rule of Maryland premises liability law that a landlord is not liable for injuries to a tenant or third party caused by defects or dangerous conditions where the landlord, or owner, has completely parted with control of the leased premises. Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 161 A. 172, 172-73 (Md. 1932). The Maryland Court of Appeals, the highest court of the State of Maryland, has stated the rationale for this rule:
When land is leased to a tenant, the law of property regards the lease as equivalent to a sale of the premises for the term. The lessee acquires an estate in the land, and becomes for the time being both owner and occupier, subject to all of the responsibilities of one in possession, to those who enter upon the land and those outside of its boundaries.
Henley v. Prince George's Cnty., 305 Md. 320, 503 A.2d 1333, 1342 (Md. 1986) (quoting William L. Prosser & Robert E. Keeton, Law of Torts § 63, at 434 (5th ed. 1984)).
Conversely, a landlord owes a duty to the occupant of a leased property or to a third party on the premises if: (1) the landlord controlled the dangerous or defective condition; (2) the landlord knew or should have known of the condition; and (3) the loss suffered was a foreseeable result of that condition. Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443, 452 (Md. 2003). For example, where a landlord has leased premises to multiple tenants, it has a duty to maintain common areas under its control in a reasonably safe condition. E.g., Shields v. Wagman, 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881, 884-85 (Md. 1988); Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain, 244 Md. 590, 224 A.2d 433, 435-436 (Md. 1966). When analyzing a landlord's duty, courts must apply a balancing test, considering the landlord's degree of control and ability to remedy the condition along with the foreseeability of the harm. Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119, 129 (Md. 1998).
Where the landowner has totally surrendered possession and control of the premises, that should relieve the landowner of any alleged liability, as a matter of law, for the criminal acts of third parties that took place on the premises after all possession and control passed to the lessee. In Henley v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md. 320, 337-338, 503 A.2d 1333 (1986), which arose out of the brutal murder of a child, the Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment to the owner of the property, on grounds that the owner (a college) had surrendered control of the premises to the county during the period of time involved in the action. See also Rowley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 305 Md. 456, 464, 505 A.2d 494 (1986)( "The liability of a landowner for injuries received on the land is dependent upon whether the device which caused the injury is in his possession and control. Section 328 of the Restatement defines an owner and occupier of land in terms of a possessor of land. . . .”).
Maryland law is clear that liability as an owner of land is defined in terms of possession and control of the property. See Marshall v. Price, supra; Henley, supra; Rowley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 305 Md. 456, 464, 505 A.2d 494 (1986).
The Maryland Court of Appeals has observed that it is “often overlooked” that it is the possession of property, not the ownership, from which duty flows towards one who comes in contact with the property. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 44-46 (Md. 1995), overruled on other grounds, Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 694-699 (Md. 1998). The Court in Lane went on to state as follows:
In Rowley, supra, 305 Md. at 464, we said:"In determining whether the City as owner of the Convention Center owed a duty to invitees, we must consider the threshold question of whether the City was in possession and control of the building. The liability of a landowner for injuries received on the land is dependent upon whether the device which caused the injury is in his possession and control. Section 328 [E] of the Restatement defines an owner and occupier of land in terms of a possessor of land…." See also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 57, at 386 (5th ed. 1984) ("Largely for historical reasons, the rights and liabilities arising out of the condition of land, and activities conducted upon it, have been concerned chiefly with the possession of the land, and this has continued into the present day.") (emphasis added). Possession involves both the present intent to control the object and some ability to control it. Restatement §§ 216, 328 E. See also Rowley, supra, 305 Md. at 464 (quoting Restatement § 328 E); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 238 (stating that a person has possession when "he has the present intent and power to exclude others").
Lane, 338 Md. at 45-46 (footnotes omitted).
The Maryland Court of Appeals has observed that “A landlord's control over conditions on its premises always has been a critical factor that we consider in determining landlord liability.” Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 375 Md. 522, 537 (Md. 2003). When analyzing a landlord's duty, courts must apply a balancing test, considering the landlord's degree of control and ability to remedy the condition along with the foreseeability of the harm. Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119, 129 (Md. 1998). The Court of Appeals has recognized that the duty of an owner of land is limited under the “foreseeability of harm” test, to avoid liability for unreasonably remote consequences. See Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 77 (Md. 1994)(prior commercial property owner not liable to subsequent commercial property owner for negligence).
Whether the owner owed any duty to the plaintiff should ordinarily be a question of law for the court, and can often be decided by motion. In order to establish a claim for negligence under Maryland law, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual harm; and (4) the harm was proximately caused by the defendant's breach of duty. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 366 Md. 29, 782 A.2d 807, 841 (Md. 2001). Significantly, "[t]he existence of a duty is a matter of law to be determined by the court . . . ." Bobo v. Maryland, 346 Md. 706, 697 A.2d 1371, 1376 (Md. 1997).
As stated in Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P’ship, 367 Md. 522, 536 (Md. 2003):
Because whether one party owed a duty to another requires a legal determination based on statutes, rules, principles, and precedents, it is ordinarily for the court rather than the jury to decide. Valentine, 353 Md. at 549, 727 A.2d at 949 ("The existence of a legal duty is a question of law to be decided by the court."); see also W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 37, at 236 (5th ed., 1984) ("Whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant . . . . is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law . . .").
Posted by David B. Stratton on 07/23/2013 at 05:15 PM
Maryland Court upholds waiver of UM coverage
In Swartzbaugh v. Encompass Insurance Company of America, No. 100, September Term 2011 (Md. April 25, 2012), the Court held that in the context of a waiver of UM benefits under a Maryland motor vehicle insurance policy, the phrase "first named insured" refers to a person insured under the policy and specifically named in the policy, who acts on behalf of the other insured parties and is designated as such in the policy documents. In so holding, the Court rejected the insured's argument that the "first named insured" literally means the first rated driver listed on the policy.
The compulsory minimum automobile insurance liability limits under Maryland law are currently $30,000 per person for personal injuries, $60,000 aggregate, and $15,000 for property damage. A policy must include UM coverage, which under Maryland law refers both to uninsured as well as under-insured motorists. Under the Maryland Insurance Code, the default limits of UM coverage must be equal to the liability coverage under the policy. However, this level of coverage may be waived in favor of a lower amount that is at least equal to the minimum coverage required by the motor vehicle law. The waiver must be in writing on a form devised by the Maryland Insurance Administration that complies with the applicable statute. Thus, the waiver is supposed to be signed by the "first named insured", as required by statute. However, the statute does not define what the "first named insured" means.
In the Swartzbaugh case, the waiver was signed by Mrs. Swartzbaugh, who handled the family finances with respect to insurance, and who had applied for the insurance. The policy listed three vehicles, and named her husband, herself, and her daughter as drivers. Unfortunately, the daughter was later injured by an under-insured driver while she was riding as a passenger. The daughter challenged the effectiveness of the waiver of UM coverage, on the grounds that Mrs. Swartzbaugh was not in fact the "first named insured" on the policy -- rather, the father was actually the first name listed in a section labeled "Policyholder."
The Court of Appeals rejected this view, finding that name order was not determinative. Rather, the named insureds are entitled to determine who will exercise that choice and serve as primary or first named insured. The MIA waiver form fills that gap be requiring the individual who executes the form to certify his or her status as "first named insured." The Court found that this was preferable to an arbitrary designation of first named insured as whomever's name was typed first on the policy.
Posted by David B. Stratton on 05/21/2012 at 12:49 AM
Motor Vehicle Accidents
Maryland Bankruptcy Court: Trustee cannot rely on sec. 544(a)(1) or (3) to avoid equitable lien
In Janet M. Nesse, Trustee v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Adversary No. 11-00290 (Bankr. D. Md. Apr. 19, 2012), the Bankruptcy Court considered the issue whether the Trustee could utilize sec. 544(a)(1) or (3) to avoid an equitable lien against property held as tenants by the entireties where only on spouse is a debtor in bankruptcy. The Court concluded that the Trustee cannot rely on sec. 544(a)(1) or (3) to avoid the equitable lien, and that GMAC was entitled to relief under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of GMAC.
The GMAC deed of trust was never recorded. However, it was undisputed that the facts made out a prima facie claim under Maryland law of the equitable subrogation of GMAC to the loan and a deed of trust executed in favor of MortgageIT. The Trustee, however, argued that sec. 544(a) allowed her to avoid GMAC's equitable lien and defeat GMAC's equitable subrogation claim. She argued that she had the rights and powers of a judicial lien creditor under sec. 544(a)(1) and a bona fide purchaser of the Property without knowledge of the GMAC deed of trust under sec. 544(a)(3), and that those rights and powers enabled her to defeat GMAC's equitable subrogation claim. The Trustee also argued that the debtor's spouse consented to allowing her to sell the Property, and that consent bolstered the Trustee's standing under sec. 544.
GMAC argued that sec. 544(a) is not available because only the Debtor, and not the spouse, is the subject of this bankruptcy proceeding and the spouse's consent is irrelevant.
The Court found that Maryland law defeats the Trustee's claim. In Maryland, creditors of only one spouse may not reach tenancy by the entireties property for satisfaction of their claims. Property held as tenants by the entireties cannot be taken to satisfy individual debts of a husband and wife. Thus, in Maryland, a "creditor that extends credit to the debtor" could not obtain a judicial lien on property owned as tenants by the entireties. Accordingly, the Trustee could not avoid GMAC's equitable lien armed with the powers of sec. 544(a)(1).
As for sec. 544(a)(3), that section allows the Trustee to avoid an interest avoidable by "a bona fide purchaser of real property ... From the debtor . . . ." However, under Maryland law, there can be no bona fide purchaser of real property from one spouse, where the property is owned in tenancy by the entireties. Section 544(a)(3) cannot give the Trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser of the Property from the Debtor where there is no way, under Maryland law, that anyone could obtain that status.
The consent of the spouse could not give the Trustee the standing of a bona fide purchaser because the Trustee had actual knowledge of GMAC's equitable lien.
Deborah M. Whelihan of Jordan Coyne & Savits, L.L.P. was co-counsel for GMAC Mortgage, LLC in this matter.
Posted by David B. Stratton on 05/15/2012 at 01:10 PM
Maryland Premises Liability: Pit Bull Owners and Landlords Strictly Liable for Dog Bites
In Dorothy M. Tracey v. Anthony K. Solesky, et al., No. 53, Sept. Term 2012 (Md. Apr. 26, 2012), a 4-3 majority opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals modified the common law liability principles that previously applied and established a strict liability standard against owners and landlords for harboring or control in cases of Pit Bull and/or cross-bred Pit Bull dog attacks on humans on the basis that such animals are inherently dangerous.
A tenant in the defendant landlord’s building owed a pit bull that had escaped from pen with only a 4 foot high fence and an open top. The Court described the pen as obviously inadequate. On the day of the attack which gave rise to this action, the pit bull escaped from the pen twice. In the first instance, the pit bull escaped and attacked a boy, however, the owner was apparently able to restrain the dog and put it back in the pen. A short time later, the dog escaped the pen a second time and attacked a young boy, Dominic Solesky, the minor Plaintiff. Dominic was mauled by the dog, and sustained life threatening injuries, having to undergo multiple surgeries, spending seventeen days in the hospital, and one year in rehabilitation.
At the close of the Plaintiff’s case, the trial court granted the Defendant landlord’s Motion for Judgment, ruling that there was insufficient evidence to permit the issue of common law negligence to be presented to the jury. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court holding that sufficient evidence did exist as to the extent of the landlord’s knowledge as to whether the dog was dangerous in respect to the common law standards in dog attack negligence cases for the issue to go to a jury.
When the matter came before the Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the trial court was correct on the state of the common law relating to dog attacks in law in existence at the time. Prior to Tracey, the common law in Maryland was that “in order to render the owner liable in damages to one bitten by his dog, it must be proved not only that the dog was fierce, but that the owner had knowledge that he was fierce”, which was a question that had to be determined by a jury. However, deciding that the common law did not reflect the dangerous nature and numerous lawsuits that resulted from dog attacks specifically by pit bull dogs, the Court decided to change the common law.
The Court cited to numerous Maryland cases over the past 100 years involving attacks by pit bulls focusing on the dicta in Matthews v. Amberwood Associates Limited Partnership, Inc., 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998). The Court also cited several other federal and state cases as well as news articles and other reports detailing the significant number of injuries and fatalities associated with the pit bull breed and the dangers presented by them. In particular, the Court repeatedly cited studies that showed that those injured or killed by dog attacks were disproportionally by pit bulls. Similarly, the Court quoted sources which stated that pit bull attacks, unlike attacks by other dogs, occur more often, are more severe, and are more likely to result in fatalities. Also, pit bulls tend to be stronger than other dogs, often giving no warning signals before attacking, are less willing than other dogs to retreat from an attack, even when they are in considerable pain.
Consequently, by modifying Maryland’s common law standard for negligence in dog attack cases, the Court held it was pit bulls are inherently dangerous activity for which landlords may be held strictly liable, stating “When an owner or a landlord is proven to have knowledge of the presence of a pit bull or cross-bred pit bull (as both the owner and landlord did in this case) or should have had such knowledge, a prima facie case is established. It is not necessary that the landlord (or the pit bull’s owner) have actual knowledge that the specific pit bull involved is dangerous.” Tracey at 8.
Accordingly, Maryland common law now finds the owner or landlord is strictly liable for the injuries inflicted in a pit bull attack if a plaintiff proves that the landlord knew or had reason to know the dog being kept on the premise was a pit bull or cross-bred pit bull mix.
Judges Greene, Harrell, and Barbera dissented from the Majority’s ruling in part because it makes the issue of whether a dog is actually harmless, or the owner or landlord has any reason to know that the dog is dangerous, irrelevant to the standard of strict liability. Rather, liability will attach solely on the basis of the breed of the dog. The dissent was also critical of the Majority for grounding its ruling upon the perceptions about a particular breed of dog, rather than upon adjudicated facts showing that the responsible party possessed the requisite knowledge of the animal’s inclination to do harm, thereby transforming a clear factual question into a legal question in an effort to create liability on the part of the landlord.
Posted by Robert A. Anderson on 05/11/2012 at 10:41 AM
Maryland workers’ compensation: causal relationship required to relate a second injury to original
A recent Maryland Court of Special Appeals decision, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Williams, 2012 Md. App. LEXIS 46 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) has clarified the status of the law in Maryland with respect to the causal relationship required to demonstrate that a second injury (which is not physically related to the original injury, such as where a knee injury causes back pain) is causally related to an original injury, and thereby compensable.
Jan Williams, the claimant, was a mechanic for WMATA and was working for his employer in 2008 when he injured his back and left knee on the job. In March of 2009, Mr. Williams was injured while returning from lunch to physical rehabilitation for the first injury when a driver backed into him, causing injury to Williams' right knee. The Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission found the second injury to be causally related to the original injury, and the Maryland Circuit Court for Prince George's County affirmed that finding. However, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, and found that the second injury was not causally related to the original injury.
WMATA relied upon a 1996 Maryland Court of Appeals decision, Mackin v. Harris, 342 Md. 1 (1996) in support of its assertion that the second injury was not causally related to the original injury. In Mackin, the employee had slipped and fallen on a patch of ice on his way to obtain physical therapy for a work-related injury. Id. at p. 2-3. The Mackin court noted that for a subsequent injury to be compensable, it must be the "direct and material result of a compensable primary injury." Id. at 7. The Mackin court went on to note that while Professor Lex. K. Larson, a noted authority in the field of Workers Compensation law, advocated a "but-for causation" approach to the issue, the Mackin court felt this was too broad a standard, and that acceptance of that standard "leads to rather extraordinary results." Id. at p. 9.
The Williams court found that while the Prince George's County Circuit Court had utilized Mackin in its analysis of the issue, the Circuit Court had missed the fact that the Mackin court advocated for a much more narrow standard-- namely, that the subsequent injury must have been a "direct causal connection" between the original compensable injury and the subsequent injury in order to have been proximately caused by the original injury. 2012 Md. App. LEXIS at p. 11. Using that standard, the Williams court concluded that Mr. Williams second injury directly resulted from a cause unrelated to the first injury-- namely, the driver's actions in striking Mr. Williams with his car in the parking lot. Id. at p. 12. Because the driver's actions had no connection whatsoever to the original injury, there was no proximate cause between the original injury and the subsequent injury. (Had the same situation been presented using the "but-for" standard of causation, the claim would arguably have been compensable-- as but for the original injury, Mr. Williams would not have been in the parking lot and would not have been struck.)
While the Court reversed the Circuit Court's findings, it remanded the matter in order to resolve a different issue-- whether the subsequent injury would be compensable as a new work-related injury, standing alone. As such, the matter was remanded to the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission to determine that issue.
Posted by Padraic K. Keane on 05/07/2012 at 05:04 PM
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