http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/ Recent Case Notes en info@jocs-law.com Copyright 2009 2009-04-08T14:12:29+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/recent_case_notes_from_jordan_coyne_savits_llp http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/recent_case_notes_from_jordan_coyne_savits_llp#When:16:51:00Z The materials contained on this web site have been prepared by Jordan Coyne & Savits L.L.P. for informational purposes only, and should not be considered as legal advice as to any specific matter or transaction. Readers should consult a knowledgeable attorney, licensed in their home State, for advice. These materials may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. The descriptions of the resolutions of certain matters should in no way be taken as an indication of future results; litigation is inherently unpredictable. Subscribe in a reader 2011-01-06T16:51:00+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/maryland_court_upholds_waiver_of_um_coverage http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/maryland_court_upholds_waiver_of_um_coverage#When:00:49:33Z In Swartzbaugh v. Encompass Insurance Company of America, No. 100, September Term 2011 (Md. April 25, 2012), the Court held that in the context of a waiver of UM benefits under a Maryland motor vehicle insurance policy, the phrase "first named insured" refers to a person insured under the policy and specifically named in the policy, who acts on behalf of the other insured parties and is designated as such in the policy documents.  In so holding, the Court rejected the insured's argument that the "first named insured" literally means the first rated driver listed on the policy.  The compulsory minimum automobile insurance liability limits under Maryland law are currently $30,000 per person for personal injuries, $60,000 aggregate, and $15,000 for property damage.  A policy must include UM coverage, which under Maryland law refers both to uninsured as well as under-insured motorists.    Under the Maryland Insurance Code, the default limits of UM coverage must be equal to the liability coverage under the policy.  However, this level of coverage may be waived in favor of a lower amount that is at least equal to the minimum coverage required by the motor vehicle law.  The waiver must be in writing on a form devised by the Maryland Insurance Administration that complies with the applicable statute.  Thus, the waiver is supposed to be signed by the "first named insured", as required by statute.  However, the statute does not define what the "first named insured" means. In the Swartzbaugh case, the waiver was signed by Mrs. Swartzbaugh, who handled the family finances with respect to insurance, and who had applied for the insurance.  The policy listed three vehicles, and named her husband, herself, and her daughter as drivers.  Unfortunately, the daughter was later injured by an under-insured driver while she was riding as a passenger.  The daughter challenged the effectiveness of the waiver of UM coverage, on the grounds that Mrs. Swartzbaugh was not in fact the "first named insured" on the policy -- rather, the father was actually the first name listed in a section labeled "Policyholder."  The Court of Appeals rejected this view, finding that name order was not determinative.  Rather, the named insureds are entitled to determine who will exercise that choice and serve as primary or first named insured.  The MIA waiver form fills that gap be requiring the individual who executes the form to certify his or her status as "first named insured."  The Court found that this was preferable to an arbitrary designation of first named insured as whomever's name was typed first on the policy. Insurance, Maryland, Motor Vehicle Accidents, 2012-05-21T00:49:33+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/maryland_bankruptcy_court_trustee_cannot_rely_on_sec._544a1_or_3_to_avoid_e http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/maryland_bankruptcy_court_trustee_cannot_rely_on_sec._544a1_or_3_to_avoid_e#When:13:10:39Z In Janet M. Nesse, Trustee v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Adversary No. 11-00290 (Bankr. D. Md. Apr. 19, 2012), the Bankruptcy Court considered the issue whether the Trustee could utilize sec. 544(a)(1) or (3) to avoid an equitable lien against property held as tenants by the entireties where only on spouse is a debtor in bankruptcy.  The Court concluded that the Trustee cannot rely on sec. 544(a)(1) or (3) to avoid the equitable lien, and that GMAC was entitled to relief under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.  The Court granted summary judgment in favor of GMAC. The GMAC deed of trust was never recorded.  However, it was undisputed that the facts made out a prima facie claim under Maryland law of the equitable subrogation of GMAC to the loan and a deed of trust executed in favor of MortgageIT.  The Trustee, however, argued that sec. 544(a) allowed her to avoid GMAC's equitable lien and defeat GMAC's equitable subrogation claim.  She argued that she had the rights and powers of a judicial lien creditor under sec. 544(a)(1) and a bona fide purchaser of the Property without knowledge of the GMAC deed of trust under sec. 544(a)(3), and that those rights and powers enabled her to defeat GMAC's equitable subrogation claim.  The Trustee also argued that the debtor's spouse consented to allowing her to sell the Property, and that consent bolstered the Trustee's standing under sec. 544. GMAC argued that sec. 544(a) is not available because only the Debtor, and not the spouse, is the subject of this bankruptcy proceeding and the spouse's consent is irrelevant. The Court found that Maryland law defeats the Trustee's claim.  In Maryland, creditors of only one spouse may not reach tenancy by the entireties property for satisfaction of their claims.  Property held as tenants by the entireties cannot be taken to satisfy individual debts of a husband and wife.  Thus, in Maryland, a "creditor that extends credit to the debtor" could not obtain a judicial lien on property owned as tenants by the entireties.  Accordingly, the Trustee could not avoid GMAC's equitable lien armed with the powers of sec. 544(a)(1). As for sec. 544(a)(3), that section allows the Trustee to avoid an interest avoidable by "a bona fide purchaser of real property ... From the debtor . . . ."  However, under Maryland law, there can be no bona fide purchaser of real property from one spouse, where the property is owned in tenancy by the entireties.  Section 544(a)(3) cannot give the Trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser of the Property from the Debtor where there is no way, under Maryland law, that anyone could obtain that status. The consent of the spouse could not give the Trustee the standing of a bona fide purchaser because the Trustee had actual knowledge of GMAC's equitable lien. Deborah M. Whelihan of Jordan Coyne & Savits, L.L.P. was co-counsel for GMAC Mortgage, LLC in this matter. Maryland, 2012-05-15T13:10:39+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/maryland_premises_liability_pit_bull_owners_and_landlords_strictly_liable_f http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/maryland_premises_liability_pit_bull_owners_and_landlords_strictly_liable_f#When:10:41:08Z In Dorothy M. Tracey v. Anthony K. Solesky, et al., No. 53, Sept. Term 2012 (Md. Apr. 26, 2012), a 4-3 majority opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals modified the common law liability principles that previously applied and established a strict liability standard against owners and landlords for harboring or control in cases of Pit Bull and/or cross-bred Pit Bull dog attacks on humans on the basis that such animals are inherently dangerous. A tenant in the defendant landlord’s building owed a pit bull that had escaped from pen with only a 4 foot high fence and an open top.  The Court described the pen as obviously inadequate.  On the day of the attack which gave rise to this action, the pit bull escaped from the pen twice.  In the first instance, the pit bull escaped and attacked a boy, however, the owner was apparently able to restrain the dog and put it back in the pen.  A short time later, the dog escaped the pen a second time and attacked a young boy, Dominic Solesky, the minor Plaintiff.  Dominic was mauled by the dog, and sustained life threatening injuries, having to undergo multiple surgeries, spending seventeen days in the hospital, and one year in rehabilitation. At the close of the Plaintiff’s case, the trial court granted the Defendant landlord’s Motion for Judgment, ruling that there was insufficient evidence to permit the issue of common law negligence to be presented to the jury. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court holding that sufficient evidence did exist as to the extent of the landlord’s knowledge as to whether the dog was dangerous in respect to the common law standards in dog attack negligence cases for the issue to go to a jury. When the matter came before the Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the trial court was correct on the state of the common law relating to dog attacks in law in existence at the time.  Prior to Tracey, the common law in Maryland was that “in order to render the owner liable in damages to one bitten by his dog, it must be proved not only that the dog was fierce, but that the owner had knowledge that he was fierce”, which was a question that had to be determined by a jury.  However, deciding that the common law did not reflect the dangerous nature and numerous lawsuits that resulted from dog attacks specifically by pit bull dogs, the Court decided to change the common law. The Court cited to numerous Maryland cases over the past 100 years involving attacks by pit bulls focusing on the dicta in Matthews v. Amberwood Associates Limited Partnership, Inc., 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998).  The Court also cited several other federal and state cases as well as news articles and other reports detailing the significant number of injuries and fatalities associated with the pit bull breed and the dangers presented by them.  In particular, the Court repeatedly cited studies that showed that those injured or killed by dog attacks were disproportionally by pit bulls.  Similarly, the Court quoted sources which stated that pit bull attacks, unlike attacks by other dogs, occur more often, are more severe, and are more likely to result in fatalities.  Also, pit bulls tend to be stronger than other dogs, often giving no warning signals before attacking, are less willing than other dogs to retreat from an attack, even when they are in considerable pain.  Consequently, by modifying Maryland’s common law standard for negligence in dog attack cases, the Court held it was pit bulls are inherently dangerous activity for which landlords may be held strictly liable, stating “When an owner or a landlord is proven to have knowledge of the presence of a pit bull or cross-bred pit bull (as both the owner and landlord did in this case) or should have had such knowledge, a prima facie case is established. It is not necessary that the landlord (or the pit bull’s owner) have actual knowledge that the specific pit bull involved is dangerous.” Tracey at 8. Accordingly, Maryland common law now finds the owner or landlord is strictly liable for the injuries inflicted in a pit bull attack if a plaintiff proves that the landlord knew or had reason to know the dog being kept on the premise was a pit bull or cross-bred pit bull mix. Judges Greene, Harrell, and Barbera dissented from the Majority’s ruling in part because it makes the issue of whether a dog is actually harmless, or the owner or landlord has any reason to know that the dog is dangerous, irrelevant to the standard of strict liability. Rather, liability will attach solely on the basis of the breed of the dog.   The dissent was also critical of the Majority for grounding its ruling upon the perceptions about a particular breed of dog, rather than upon adjudicated facts showing that the responsible party possessed the requisite knowledge of the animal’s inclination to do harm, thereby transforming a clear factual question into a legal question in an effort to create liability on the part of the landlord. Maryland, 2012-05-11T10:41:08+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/maryland_workers_compensation_causal_relationship_required_to_relate_a_seco http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/maryland_workers_compensation_causal_relationship_required_to_relate_a_seco#When:17:04:45Z A recent Maryland Court of Special Appeals decision, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Williams, 2012 Md. App. LEXIS 46 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) has clarified the status of the law in Maryland with respect to the causal relationship required to demonstrate that a second injury (which is not physically related to the original injury, such as where a knee injury causes back pain) is causally related to an original injury, and thereby compensable. Jan Williams, the claimant, was a mechanic for WMATA and was working for his employer in 2008 when he injured his back and left knee on the job.  In March of 2009, Mr. Williams was injured while returning from lunch to physical rehabilitation for the first injury when a driver backed into him, causing injury to Williams' right knee.  The Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission found the second injury to be causally related to the original injury, and the Maryland Circuit Court for Prince George's County affirmed that finding.  However, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, and found that the second injury was not causally related to the original injury. WMATA relied upon a 1996 Maryland Court of Appeals decision, Mackin v. Harris, 342 Md. 1 (1996) in support of its assertion that the second injury was not causally related to the original injury.  In Mackin, the employee had slipped and fallen on a patch of ice on his way to obtain physical therapy for a work-related injury.  Id. at p. 2-3.  The Mackin court noted that for a subsequent injury to be compensable, it must be the "direct and material result of a compensable primary injury."  Id. at 7.  The Mackin court went on to note that while Professor Lex. K. Larson, a noted authority in the field of Workers Compensation law, advocated a "but-for causation" approach to the issue, the Mackin court felt this was too broad a standard, and that acceptance of that standard "leads to rather extraordinary results."  Id. at p. 9. The Williams court found that while the Prince George's County Circuit Court had utilized Mackin in its analysis of the issue, the Circuit Court had missed the fact that the Mackin court advocated for a much more narrow standard-- namely, that the subsequent injury must have been a "direct causal connection" between the original compensable injury and the subsequent injury in order to have been proximately caused by the original injury.  2012 Md. App. LEXIS at p. 11.  Using that standard, the Williams court concluded that Mr. Williams second injury directly resulted from a cause unrelated to the first injury-- namely, the driver's actions in striking Mr. Williams with his car in the parking lot.  Id. at p. 12.  Because the driver's actions had no connection whatsoever to the original injury, there was no proximate cause between the original injury and the subsequent injury.  (Had the same situation been presented using the "but-for" standard of causation, the claim would arguably have been compensable-- as but for the original injury, Mr. Williams would not have been in the parking lot and would not have been struck.) While the Court reversed the Circuit Court's findings, it remanded the matter in order to resolve a different issue-- whether the subsequent injury would be compensable as a new work-related injury, standing alone.  As such, the matter was remanded to the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission to determine that issue.      Maryland, Workers Compensation, 2012-05-07T17:04:45+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/insurance_coverage_action_in_maryland_dismissed_based_on_abstention http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/insurance_coverage_action_in_maryland_dismissed_based_on_abstention#When:22:15:10Z In Evanston Insurance Company v. Dan Ryan Builders, Inc., No. 11-02366 (D. Md. Feb. 13, 2012), the Court granted the insureds' motion to dismiss an insurer's declaratory judgment action, finding in favor of abstention based on parallel litigation pending in state court. The defendants were Maryland contractors who were sued in West Virginia concerning construction defects in a home they had built in Martinsburg, West Virginia.  The West Virginia suit raised claims of negligence, breach of contract, and fraud or fraudulent concealment, based on allegations that the defendants had failed to disclose that the  home was subject to flooding during major storm events, and that its septic system had failed. The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, to establish that it has no duty to defend or indemnify.  Three days after service of the federal suit, the West Virginia suit was amended, adding the insurer as a defendant, and adding an additional count for a declaratory judgment establishing coverage for the claims raised in the suit.  Subsequently, the defendant insureds filed a motion to dismiss the federal declaratory judgment action, arguing that the same coverage issues will be decided in the West Virginia litigation, and that the federal court should abstain.  (Such a procedure was authorized by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 1989.  See Christian v. Sizemore, 383 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1989). The rule in the Fourth Circuit is that when an insurer files a declaratory judgment action on coverage issues in a District Court while the underlying litigation against its insured is pending in the state courts, considerations of federalism, efficiency, and comity give the District Court the discretion to refuse to entertain the action, even when the declaratory relief sought would serve a useful purpose.  The District Court is required to weigh four factors when considering whether to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of a parallel state proceeding:  (1) the strength of the state's interest in having the issues raised in the federal declaratory action decided in state court; (2) whether the issues can be more efficiently resolved in the court where the state claims are pending; (3) whether there are common factual and legal issues in the federal and state actions which would cause the federal action to be unnecessarily entangled with the state court action; and (4) whether the declaratory judgment action is being used merely as a device for procedural fencing, i.e., the provide another forum in a race for res judicata or to achieve a federal hearing in a case otherwise not removable. See Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Poston, 88 F.3d 255, 257-78 (4th Cir. 1996). Analyzing these factors, the District Court decided in favor of abstention.  West Virginia had the stronger interest in resolving coverage issues concerning conduct in West Virginia that allegedly caused damage to property in West Virginia.  Second, the West Virginia action could resolve all issues, which was more efficient.   Third, resolution of the duty to indemnify in federal court would depend on resolution of the same factual and legal issues pending in state court.  Finally, the Court rejected the insurer's argument that the addition of the coverage issues to the West Virginia action was procedural fencing, which should not be countenanced.  The District Court accepted the insured's argument that they had not initiated either the West Virginia action or the federal declaratory action, and that the conduct of the plaintiffs in the West Virginia action was of no import. Insurance, Maryland, 2012-04-29T22:15:10+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/partner_john_tremain_may_selected_for_inclusion_to_2012_dc_super_lawyers_li http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/partner_john_tremain_may_selected_for_inclusion_to_2012_dc_super_lawyers_li#When:13:55:37Z Congratulations to Partner John Tremain May on his selection for inclusion to the 2012 DC Super Lawyers  List.   The Super Lawyers Magazine conducts an annual rating process that includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations.  This selection demonstrates that John has achieved a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement Jordan Coyne & Savits, L.L.P. news, 2012-04-27T13:55:37+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/virginia_rejects_attempt_to_limit_pollution_exclusions_to_traditional_envir http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/virginia_rejects_attempt_to_limit_pollution_exclusions_to_traditional_envir#When:14:59:31Z In PBM Nutritionals, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 110669 (Va. Apr. 20, 2012), the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment that pollution exclusions barred coverage for a multi-million dollar loss resulting from a manufacturing incident that contaminated a number of lots of infant formula, which all had to be destroyed as a result.  In so doing, the Court rejected the arguments that the pollution exclusions are ambiguous because they are overly broad and could exclude nearly any loss, and that the Circuit Court erred in failing to limit the scope of the pollution exclusion endorsements to traditional environmental losses in order to avoid the problem of illusory coverage.  Instead, the Court agreed with the insurers and the Circuit Court that the plain text of the endorsements should be applied.  After citing to City of Chesapeake v. States Self-Insurers Risk Retention Group, 271 Va. 574, 628 S.E.2d 539 (2006), the Court reasoned that none of the pollution exclusions referenced any terms such as "environment", environmental", "industrial," or any other limiting language suggesting that the exclusions are limited to "traditional" rather than "indoor" pollution.  There was no language suggesting that the discharges or dispersals of pollutants or contaminants must be into the environment or atmosphere.    The Court concluded that according to their plain language, the pollution exclusions are not restricted to traditional environmental pollution, and held that the Circuit Court did not err in refusing to limit the insurers' pollution exclusion endorsements to traditional environmental contamination losses. In PBM Nutritionals, the contamination occurred when superheated water caused water filters to disintegrate into their constituent components of cellulose, melamine, and other materials, which infiltrated the water from which the lots of infant formula were manufactured.  Quality control testing discovered the contamination, and all batches manufactured during that period had to be destroyed. This decision confirms that Virginia will not follow other jurisdictions which have limited pollution exclusions to traditional, environmental pollution.   Insurance, Virginia, 2012-04-23T14:59:31+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/pollution_exclusion_bars_coverage_for_claims_of_injury_from_noxious_odors_f http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/pollution_exclusion_bars_coverage_for_claims_of_injury_from_noxious_odors_f#When:13:38:10Z In Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., No. 11-565 (E.D. Pa. March 30, 2012), the Court awarded summary judgment to two insurers on the grounds that coverage for the underlying lawsuit concerning odors from a "pig-raising operation" were barred by the pollution exclusions in the policies. The pig-raising operation in question was the Sky View Sow Unit, a 2,800-sow production facility at which female pigs give birth to and raise baby pigs.  At the facility, the pigs' excrement is collected in a large, cement pit directly beneath the structure where the pigs are housed.  The pig wastes are periodically removed and deposited on nearby fields as fertilizer. The neighbors of Sky View brought suit in federal court in Indiana, alleging that the sow facility produces "harmful and ill-smelling odors, hazardous substances and contaminated wastewater" that escape onto their properties causing personal injury and property damage.  The plaintiffs alleged that the sow facility, together with the land application fields where the defendants dispose of millions of gallons of hog waste every hear, the contaminated runoff, and the facility's method of disposal of dead hogs, produces offensive and noxious odors which impair plaintiffs' use and quiet enjoyment of their properties and causes plaintiffs to experience sudden onset physical manifestations including nausea, vomiting, headaches, breathing difficulties, burning and irritated eyes, noses, and throats, and aggravation of other medical conditions. The insurance policies both included pollution exclusions, which excluded coverage for harm arising from the insured's release or discharge of a pollutant.  Both included the standard definition of "pollutant" as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.  Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed."  Both policies included an Indiana-specific endorsement that amended the definition of pollutant to include "any such irritant or contaminant whether or not it has or had any function in your business, operations, premises, site or location . . . ." Applying Pennsylvania law, the Court found it was undisputed that the complaint alleges bodily injury and property damage.  The insureds, however, argued that the noxious odors were not a pollutant as that term is defined in the policies.  The issue thus became whether the policies' definition of "pollutant" applies unambiguously to the noxious odors identified in the complaint. Based on the policies' definitions and the common meaning of key terms as defined in dictionaries, the Court found that noxious odors produced by pig excrement (or waste) that cause bodily injury and property damage appear to fit squarely within the definition of pollutant under the policies.  The Court found that the fact that the pig waste is spread over fields as fertilizer is of no moment, as "waste" includes materials left over from a production operation, and the policies' definition of pollutant expressly includes waste that is to be reused.  The Court noted that several Pennsylvania cases have held allegedly noxious fumes constitute a pollutant triggering the pollution exclusion, e.g., fumes from a cement curing agent, carbon monoxide fumes emitted from a gas-powered saw, fumes from house-cleaning compounds, and fumes and runoff from a landfill. The plaintiffs argued that simple odors cannot be pollutants, and that the allegation of foul odors is too ambiguous to be construed as a pollutant barring coverage.  Further, they argued that in a rural setting, simple farm odors cannot be pollutants because such odors are commonplace.  The Court rejected these arguments, on the grounds that the odors described in the complaint were not merely unpleasant, but were alleged to cause bodily injury and property damage.  In addition, the Court fond that that "a pollutant does not cease being a pollutant simply because it is common to an area."  Further, the Court identified numerous precedents from other jurisdictions which applied nearly identical definitions of "pollutant" to noxious odors.  The Court also recognized that large livestock feeding operations are regulated through the Clean Water Act, because of the amount of animal excrement they produce. Accordingly, the Court found that the pollution exclusions in the two policies unambiguously applied to the claims in the complaint, and that the insurers had no duty to defend or indemnify. Insurance, 2012-04-18T13:38:10+00:00 http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/lawyers_professional_liability_unreported_administrative_error_results_in_d http://jordancoyne.com/index.php/website/blog/lawyers_professional_liability_unreported_administrative_error_results_in_d#When:13:34:10Z In Minnesota Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baylor & Jackson, PLLC, No. 10-2701 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2012), the District Court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that the insurer is not liable to defend or indemnify the defendant law firm under an LPL policy.  The Court awarded summary judgment based on the finding that any reasonable lawyer would have been worried about a malpractice claim after summary judgment had been awarded in the underlying action based on the insured law firm's administrative error in submitting an unexecuted affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. This matter arose out of the insured law firm's representation of a client who was involved in a dispute concerning various agreements as to the funding of litigation against the United States and the allocation of any proceeds from that litigation.  That dispute resulted in a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, before Judge Kaplan, in which the insured law firm represented the defendant. Judge Kaplan awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff in that action, in part because the defendants never contested the validity of the underlying agreement.  One of the defendants tried to contest the validity in his opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, but he failed to submit either an affidavit or a sworn statement to support his contention, and Judge Kaplan disregarded his argument. In the subsequent coverage action, the District Court noted that the record indicated that an unexecuted affidavit had been attached to the opposition memorandum in error, and at the ensuing hearing in August, 2006, Judge Kaplan refused either to allow the defendant to execute the affidavit or to testify to the contents of the affidavit despite his presence at the hearing.  The total damages awarded to the plaintiff in that action was about $2.6 million, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal in 2009.  The appellate court also observed that the defendants opposition to summary judgment was not supported by any sworn evidence as required by Md. Rule 2-501.  The appellate court noted that the failure to properly place facts in dispute affected the arguments on all the counts. The insured law firm had placed Minnesota Mutual on notice as soon as it they had received the appellate court's opinion on July 9, 2009.  The former client filed a malpractice suit in August, 2009.  Although Minnesota Mutual initially defended, presumably under a reservation of rights, it eventually withdrew from the defense and disclaimed coverage.  This was because the insurer had concluded that the insured law firm should have reported the potential claim during the policy period of August 1, 2006 to August 1, 2007, because it was during that time that the firm "first became aware of facts which could have reasonably supported the claim asserted against it . . . ."  Minnesota Mutual filed a declaratory judgment action to establish its lack of liability for the defense and indemnification of the insured law firm in the legal malpractice action. The Minnesota Mutual policy was a claims made and reported policy.  It stated, among other things, that a claim is deemed made when "an act, error or omission by any INSURED occurs which has not resulted in a demand for DAMAGES but which an INSURED knows or reasonably should know, would support such a demand." The Policy definition of "CLAIM(S)" also provided, in part, that it means "An act, error or omission by any INSURED which has not resulted in a demand for DAMAGES but which an INSURED knows or reasonably should know, would support such a demand." The District Court, in awarding summary judgment to Minnesota Mutual, found that "the act, error, or omission giving rise to the Underlying Defendants' malpractice claim occurred on August 11, 2006, when [the insured law firm] . . . filed the opposition to summary judgment without supporting evidence."  Maryland employs an objective standard for evaluating the reasonableness of an insured's actions in relation to the obligation to notify an insurance company of a potential claim.  An insured's notice obligation accrues when the circumstances known to the insured at that time would have suggested to a reasonable person the possibility of a claim.  The District Court found that: Thus, any reasonable lawyer faced with a motion for summary judgment could simply have read Maryland Rule 2-501 and known that an unexecuted affidavit does not satisfy the Maryland standard for summary-judgment practice. [The insured law firm] . . .  reasonably could have become aware, probably acutely aware, of that during the motions hearing when Judge Kaplan refused to let [the client] . . .  either execute the affidavit or provide testimony at the hearing. . . . It certainly should have become aware of its shortcoming when Judge Kaplan rendered his opinion on August 22, 2006, specifically pointing out the absence of admissible evidence from the opposition that could possibly establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Any reasonable lawyer would have read Judge Kaplan's opinion with alarm as to what it meant to him or her personally. Any reasonable lawyer would have been worried it could lead to a malpractice claim. At that point, a claim was deemed made under the 2006 Policy. And at that point, [the insured law firm] . . .  had to report the claim during the 2006 Policy term in order for it to be a covered claim. Consequently, [the insured law firm's] . . .  failure to report it during the 2006 Policy term precluded coverage. The Court rejected the insured law firm's argument that it had no reason to give notice to Minnesota Mutual in 2006 because Judge Kaplan's grant of summary judgment was based upon multiple alternative grounds, only one of which was the lack of an affidavit.  The Court reasoned that any reasonable lawyer would have been aware that Maryland appellate courts may affirm a summary judgment on any one of several alternative grounds, and thus, the insured law firm risked appellate affirmance solely on the basis of the firm's malpractice. The District Court also found that an alternative ground for finding no coverage was that the insured law firm in 2007 failed to report on its application for renewal of its Minnesota Mutual policy, "any INCIDENT which could reasonably result in a claim being made against the firm or a member of the firm". The Court found that the failure to report this incident until July 9, 2009 could have been reasonably regarded by Minnesota Mutual as a material misrepresentation, and the insurer was entitled to decline coverage under the 2009 policy on the ground of material misrepresentation.   Finally, the District Court rejected the insured law firm's argument that Minnesota Mutual could not show actual prejudice due to late notice, under Md. Ins. Code sec. 19-110.  The District Court concluded that under the language of the Minnesota Mutual policy, the time for reporting was no mere "notice provision", but was incorporated into the definition of coverage and therefore became a condition precedent to coverage.  Consequently, the insured law firm's failure to report the claim within the policy term or extended reporting period amounted to a failure to perform a condition precedent to coverage.  The 2006 policy expired by the time the claim was reported to the insurer, and so coverage was never triggered for this incident.  Thus no breach of the 2006 policy occurred and the insurer is not required to show actual prejudice in order to disclaim coverage under Section 19-110.  Even if the insurer were required to show prejudice, the Court found that it could have easily done so by showing it had been excluded from the post-summary judgment and appellate proceedings which were the only opportunities in which the insurer could have had to fashion a request for relief. Insurance, Legal Malpractice, Maryland, 2012-04-16T13:34:10+00:00